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ABSTRACT 
 
In her recent book Blush: Faces of Shame, Elspeth Probyn offers a profile of shame 
drawing on the disciplines of psychology, sociology and cultural anthropology. She 
argues that shame is a) inherently value-oriented, b) necessary for human well-being 
and c) universal or ‘essential’ as a human phenomenon. This approach to shame has 
significant resonances with the theological anthropology and christian ethics of 
Thomas Aquinas. In exploring these authors, we can gain a clearer picture of the 
transformative function of shame in the personal, social, cultural and moral 
dimensions of human life. 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
We all blush, feel uncomfortable, and for a host of reasons. As part of life, shame 
‘raises questions of great and enduring interest concerning what it means to be 
human’. These words encapsulate Elspeth Probyn’s concern in Blush: Faces of Shame 
(xviii).1 This is an enlightening, enjoyable and even uplifting work, due to its 
accessible scholarship, personal engagement and, at times, the author’s courageous 
transparency.  
 
In accepting the author’s invitation to come exploring with her, I found myself 
following her suggestion to discover ‘sidetracks’ of my own. Naturally, some of these 
were in personal memories. But I was often intrigued with the number of times 
Probyn’s investigations appeared to resonate with the work of Thomas Aquinas on 
shame. In this article I would like to meander down that sidetrack and probe 
perspectives from the thirteenth and twenty first century.  
 
My approach will use three key positions argued in Blush (ix-xviii) as markers to re-
visit Aquinas’ discussion of shame in his Summa Theologiae. For Probyn shame a) 
consistently entails values, self-evaluation and the contours of living a good life; b) is 
an integral part of healthy human functioning in the personal and social realms;  c) 
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can be seen as a universal, even ‘essential’, aspect of human life. I will compare and 
contrast Probyn and Aquinas in three stages: first, in relation to their respective 
contexts, aims and methodologies; second, in their understandings of the meaning and 
role of shame; thirdly, to conclude by some brief observations about shame in the 
contemporary context.  
 
1. Contexts, Aims and Methodologies 
Naturally, Probyn and 
Aquinas have differing 
historical contexts. The 
backdrop to Probyn’s book is 
the world shaped by post-
modernism, pluralism of 
cultures, multiple 
perspectives and especially 
that of feminist thought. 
Further, her methodology 
blends the empirical 
(quantitative research), the 
qualitative (personal 
experience and narrative), with insights from sociology, psychological theory and 
cultural anthropology. Her conclusions and arguments have their grounding in 
researched data and informed commentary.  
Image Source: Wikimedia Commons 
 
Alternatively, Aquinas’ setting is the relatively stable world of the thirteenth century 
and its classical world-view. While open to other cultural perspectives (e.g., Islamic), 
his primary aim is to elaborate a theological synthesis of the Christian faith within an 
ecclesial context. He uses the tools of philosophy, especially of metaphysics and 
philosophical psychology. His writing is, at times, informed by his personal 
experience, as in his insightful calibrations of love and friendship. But, overall, his 
work is characterized more by philosophical argument from reflection on common 
experience than by rigorous empirical method or the warmth of personal narrative.  
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Again, while Probyn acknowledges the role of other emotions and affective realities, 
her dominant focus is on shame’s role in human life. Aquinas has a broader canvas. In 
the equivalent of two or three books, he develops a moral psychology of the emotions, 
the affective virtues and their role in moral action, virtue and the Christian life.  
 
Between the two authors, there is an interesting point of convergence.  Probyn 
presents two approaches to shame. As a psychological/ scientific reality, shame is an 
‘affect’ that involves the workings of the brain and associated bodily reverberations. 
As a sociological/cultural reality, shame is an ‘emotion’ which has a cognitive 
component and is expressed socially. Interestingly, this approach has its parallel in 
Aquinas’ recognition of the psychosomatic aspects of human behaviour.  He uses 
‘passions’ to describe movements of what he names the ‘sensory appetite’ – the 
bodily aspect of human affectivity that is ‘affected’ or ‘moved’ to be immediately 
responsive to sense experience, particularly in the area of relationships.. It entails a 
both a bodily alteration together with an evaluative cognition of an object – an attitude 
for or against an object perceived to be good or bad, hence love, desire, hate, fear etc.2  
For Aquinas, ‘passion’ is a blend of ‘affect’ and ‘emotion’ found in Probyn.  
 
2. Meaning and Role of Shame  
Think of four moments when we find 
ourselves embarrassed. I walk into a room 
and think someone else is smiling at me. 
My interest is aroused. I move forward to 
talk to the person and realize that the smile 
was directed to someone just to my left. I 
had misread a cue. There was recognition, 
interest but it was misplaced. I feel 
awkward and self-conscious.  
 
Image Source: Wikimedia Commons 
 
Or I walk through a half closed door. I find two people in a hushed conversation. I 
instinctively say ‘sorry’ and withdraw. Or it may be that the same couple are 
embracing or even engaged in sexually intimacy. My discomfort is more intense. I 
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quickly stammer a blushing apology then make a fast retreat from a similarly red-
faced couple.  
 
Thirdly, I see a public figure covering his face with a newspaper on TV. I am not sure 
if he is a convicted criminal leaving a courthouse or someone innocent hounded by 
paparazzi. There is something instinctive about hiding from public gaze. The esteem 
of others is important for us. How mortified we would be if some of our most secret 
failures were ever exposed.   
 
Finally, I think back to childhood as does Probyn, to the time as an eight year old 
when she made another girl cry. She teased her because she did not have the same 
name as her mother. The author recognizes that she was a child. She could not have 
appreciated that the little girl’s mother had remarried and taken another man’s name. 
But, even years later, this does not stop Elspeth Probyn from blushing. As with the 
other examples above, we can readily identify with the sense of feeling small and 
undone, even from the flash of memory of a shameful moment from our childhood.       
 
What do these scenarios have in common?  It is my body telling me that I am out of 
place. I have not been invited to join the person who seems to smile in my direction. 
Or in entering another’s physical space, two people feel invaded and I, an intruder. I 
readily appreciate the bite of another’s public exposure even if they are innocent. Or I 
may have demeaned and humiliated someone. I feel diminished in my diminishing of 
the other person. I remember how, in that instance, I was not the person I would like 
to be. What is common in these examples is that I have been affected in a bodily and 
psychological way. I am emotionally moved in that my body instantly senses that a 
boundary has been transgressed within the realm of those social/cultural patterns of 
how to act or not to act. This brings us then to our first marker. 
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Shame consistently entails values, self-evaluation and the 
contours of living a good life. 
 
Common to the above examples is blushing as 
‘the body calling out its interest’ (Blush, 28). 
This is not in a dualistic sense. It is about 
embodied personhood.  Probyn argues that the 
various ‘faces of shame’ reveal our desire for 
connection even the possibility of love.3 When it 
appears to be offered but isn’t, I feel exposed and 
even rebuffed. The same is true when I show 
interest in another and it is rejected. Again, I 
know that ‘mortified’ feeling if others know 
something I have done, or worse, I am caught in 
the act. What others think of me and how I think 
of others, is important to each of us. Shame is the 
register of those connections and the interest they 
involve. There is something very wrong with a person who feels no shame.4  
Image Source:  
Wikimedia Commons 
 
Shame and its accompanying interest (in myself, in others) entail what is important to 
me- the things and people I hold dear. Unlike guilt which can be dealt with and often 
put aside, shame ‘lingers deep within the self’ (Blush, 2, 45-6). When I am ashamed it 
is because of my strong interest to be good person, says Probyn. What shames you 
may not shame me. Shame is an involuntary re-evaluation of myself and my actions 
(64). It is revelatory – disclosing our ‘values, hopes and aspirations, beyond the 
generalities of good manners and cultural norms’ (Blush, x). It may even imply a 
radical shift in attitude and in embedded patterns of responding and acting (‘rerouting 
the dynamics of knowing and ignorance’, 105). There is a bridge between personal 
life and cultural practices. Thus shame comes, in a sociological term from Pierre 
Bourdieu, within the domain of habitus, a non-discursive knowing or ‘embodied 
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history, internalized as second nature’ in which the body is ‘a repository for the social 
and cultural rules that, consciously or not, we take on’ (51, xvi).  
 
Through shame, according to Probyn, we are consistently reminded that we are 
embodied beings. Whether at the interpersonal, social or cultural level, shame points 
to boundaries, to habitual patterns of how we see values and rules and respond to 
them.  It is particularly reflected across cultures in the experience of the body ‘being 
out of place’. For instance, Probyn tells of a journey to Central Australia and a visit to 
Uluru. She feels caught by a sense of being an outsider, ‘I don’t belong here’. She was 
intruding on another’s space, that of the indigenous inhabitants of the continent.  
 
Again, this is evident in awareness of what is private, even sacred, for instance, in the 
sexual area. Probyn says that sexuality (sexual identity) is commonly held ‘as an area 
ripe for shame’. But she notes that it is not necessarily a ‘site of shame’ or ‘the same 
site of shame for everyone’ (Blush, x). Later, she writes of the people of Mt Hagen 
who speak of big pipil – the shame accompanying sexual activity in public or incest 
(32). While Probyn does not investigate sexual activity in depth, we are reminded that 
there are boundaries and norms of acceptable behaviour concerning its exercise in 
every culture. Its accompanying sensitivities are trampled over by, for instance,  
pornographers who, as Graham Ward notes citing George Steiner, ‘parade the vital 
privacies ‘and whispered vulnerabilities of sexual experience.5  
 
Finally, Probyn rightly stresses that shame makes us reflect on who were are and what 
our actions might set in motion (8, 34). Its positive role as self-evaluative and self-
transforming emerges only if it is acknowledged. As with any ‘negative’ emotion, 
there is the need for conscious engagement with shame if it is contribute to human 
well-being. Shame is integral to self-assessment. To live a good life involves 
deliberation and freedom. This is particularly the case if shame is not to remain an 
expression of the super-ego or of habitus expressed as the cultural unconscious 
holding individuals in self-destructive behaviour. It must move to the realm of adult 
conscience and in collaboration with self-awareness and responsibility. This brings us 
to Aquinas and his view of shame in the setting of virtue and chosen self-direction in 
ones life.  
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For Aquinas, emotions are essential to the moral life and human integration. Shame, 
closely associated with the body (especially touch), is part of the affective virtue of 
temperance or self-care. Aquinas’ approach, contra the Stoics, is that of the average 
sensual person for whom friendship with God entails enjoyment and harmony in 
mental, bodily, sexual, emotional and social existence. While his method differs from 
that of Probyn, there are central insights that are common.   
 
In one article in the Summa Theologiae (Henceforth ST), Aquinas asks (in carefully 
worded language) whether there is any emotion that is always good or evil ‘by its very 
nature’ (ST 1.2.24.4).6 From an earlier discussion (24.1), he argues that their moral 
status is discerned as guided by reason and only in a relational context. In the 
language of traditional moral theology, an emotion, like any action, can only be 
evaluated morally in terms of its object, end and circumstances.  
 
Aquinas replies that there are two such emotions. An emotion evil by its very nature is 
envy. It is part of our humanity to recognize what is good in others and to have a basic 
response of pity and compassion to their suffering. To take pleasure in another’s 
plight or be sad at their gifts or success indicates defective self-esteem. Ones moral 
character is flawed.   
 
Alternatively, an emotion that is good of its very nature is shame (verecundia or 
modesty). Citing Aristotle’s Ethics, Aquinas says that verecundia is a praiseworthy 
emotion. He notes elsewhere that it is a virtue in the broad sense (ST 2.2.144.1) since 
‘feelings of shame’ foster a disposition to avoid what brings disgrace or opprobrium 
(ST 2.2.144.2). Modesty (verecundia) is a fear of what is base or dishonourable in 
ones behaviour (timor turpis), that ones moral excellence is somehow sullied and 
brings a sadness at its inevitability (Reid, 1965, 189). In the specific article here 
(24.4), the Blackfriars version translates timor turpis as ‘fear of unchastity’ (Vol 19, 
1967, 43).7  This rendition is debatable. However, for our purposes we can consider 
that this specific form of shame (verecundia) is representative of its wider meanings 
which all tend to revolve around self-respect. We can examine Aquinas’ approach 
first in general and then in specific terms.  
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Firstly, for Aquinas, shame (verecundia) as an emotion is good or evil of its very 
nature in a relational context, namely, as being ‘in tune’ (conveniens, fitting) or out of 
tune (dissonans, not fitting) with right reason or authentic humanity. It answers the 
question ‘how would the practically wise or virtuous person respond in this situation?’ 
It is an emotion that enhances human flourishing, personally and socially. While 
shame is negative (makes us feel uncomfortable), its positive function emerges from 
its object, namely the value it is directed towards upholding and the attitude 
produced.8 In contemporary terms, by disposing our sensitivity to what can distort our 
moral horizon, shame is a sentinel guarding our personal self-transcendence in terms 
of the search for meaning, truth and value.  
 
Aquinas is arguing that certain emotions such as shame, when understood and 
described carefully, have a built-in significance. It is not that they are morally neutral 
(psychological facts) and ones attitude to them makes them morally good. It is that the 
emotion itself crystallizes an habitual disposition to make, with ease and consistency, 
a ‘felt evaluation’ of an intentional object in that it is perceived as ‘fitting’ (good) or 
‘not fitting’(evil). This is precisely the understanding of Martha Nussbaum, cited by 
Probyn (120).9 Aquinas also holds that emotions and their level of moderation differ 
from person to person. Without resorting to ‘right’ or ‘good’ emotions being 
responses of ‘perfectly programmed’ automatons (an understandable concern of 
Probyn’s, 10), there are some ‘objects’ and situations that are arguably ‘fitting’ (right) 
and appropriate in our personal and social life. For instance, to feel no shame or 
sensitivity to another’s pain is not a desirable or even admirable state. For both 
Aquinas and Probyn, then, shame reveals both values and the moral configuration of a 
person.  It is an emotion that reverberates in both the intra-personal and inter-personal 
domains.  
 
We return to the specific aspect noted earlier, namely to shame in relation to 
sexuality. Aquinas’ cryptic, even elliptical, treatment assumes the reader’s awareness 
of the broader context of his discussion. First, Aquinas says that shame has a range of 
different bodily expressions (ST 2.2.144; Gilby, 1968, 55). Second, Aquinas’ 
treatment of the gift of sexuality is earthy and basic, without giving unchastity ‘the 
dreary eminence it has for later moralists’ (Gilby, 1968, xxiii). Third, he 
acknowledges human ambivalence in this area as in a certain ‘powerlessness’ over our 
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emotions or sexual movements (even with the virtuous exercise of ones sexuality, see 
ST 2.2.151.4). Fourth, and most importantly, it is not by chance that Aquinas’ 
language about shame, especially in relation to the sexual sphere, suggests a concern 
with self-respect or the sacredness of the person. The word verecundia (shame, 
modesty) has its verb root in vereor (respect, fear, reverence). This is foundational for 
Aquinas. For him, shame’s object is not the body or ones sexuality but the ‘out of 
place’ (dissonans) invasion of an area of embodied personhood that warrants respect.  
Hence, only with some difficulty can we construe Aquinas’ view of shame simply as 
fear of sexual sin (the misuse of one’s sexuality). In its broader setting, shame is 
prompted by a sense of respect for the self and sensitivity to ones moral ideals and 
character.10 This is evident in Aquinas’ later discussion: a) healthy self love is an 
essential component of Christian living (ST 2.2.25.4; b) we must have love for our 
body as a gift from God (ST. 2.2.25.5); c) concern for one’s own good is integral to 
virtue or moral self-transcendence (ST. 2.2.26.6). It is not surprising that, for Aquinas, 
there is some truth in saying that the more virtuous a person is, the more they will be 
sensitive to shame (ST 2.2.144.4).  
 
Probyn (briefly) and Aquinas (in his more elaborated treatment) mirror what is 
common to all cultures, namely, a sacred ‘space’ around a person as a bodily, and 
especially as a sexual being. Shame implies reverence for vulnerability and the 
intimate whispers ‘spoken in the night’ alluded to earlier.11 Aquinas himself speaks of 
a ‘certain delicacy’ needed in sexual matters and of ‘a respect which is the opposite of 
shamelessness. It sets up a certain reticence and sense of impropriety about exposure’ 
(ST 2.2.154.9). The intersection of personal and social life entails respect, care for 
oneself and boundaries. Transgression evokes an instinctual movement of shame and 
accompanying self-evaluation. This brings us to the second marker. 
 
Shame is integral to healthy human functioning both personal and 
social. 
 
In highlighting the productive role of shame (‘as an essential part of yourself’ (Blush, 
x) that we do ‘well’ together with the intimate connection between shame and interest, 
Probyn is indebted to the work of American psychologist Silvan Tomkin. Shame, like 
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fear or anger, is an emotion whose role is to make us feel uncomfortable. There are 
some things we should be ashamed of, just as there are things about which we should 
be angry or afraid. Like any emotion, especially those that we call ‘negative’, shame 
can be constructive or destructive. Feeling shame can sustain personal well-being and 
guide our responses in our relationships and social life. In this context, used properly, 
it can be a positive instrument for healing and reconciliation, as in processes of 
restorative justice (as with Maori and indigenous peoples, Blush, 90-98).  
 
On the other hand, we cannot overlook shame’s capacity to undermine the sense of 
self. For already damaged individuals, it can be ‘lethal’ (92). At the social and cultural 
level, it can be an instrument of reproach, power, control and submission. Such uses, 
especially under the ‘guise of moral rectitude’ can both unpalatable, even to be feared 
(94). There is the individual and collective historical experience of shame involving 
subordination as a ‘pervasive affective attunement to the social environment’ (Blush, 
85). Women and ethnic groups are closely acquainted with this. Through the influence 
of structures of power and of habitus, especially at the unconscious level, shame and 
patterns of humiliation can be re-activated consistently unless the pattern is broken 
and a new habitus established.  This demands conscious reflection, understanding and 
decision.  
 
For Aquinas, shame, as part of the virtue of temperance or self-care, helps us to grow 
in the likeness of God.  It is reflected in sensitivity to whatever demeans oneself as a 
person. Its companion is honestas, namely a sense of moral excellence and of love for 
its beauty. Shame makes one more sensitive to what threatens virtue, personal 
goodness, and, most importantly, what fosters or undermines our responsiveness in 
relationships (ST 2.2 142.4 and 144.1). Like Probyn, shame for Aquinas reflects 
interest in being a good person. Within the Aristotelian tradition of the virtues, 
Aquinas highlights the personal sphere, namely patterns of habitual response and 
action that are virtues or good moral habits. Alternatively, Probyn’s access to the 
social sciences enables her to analyze the dynamics of social and cultural influences 
on personal life, especially in their destructive forms.12 In dealing with such 
distortions, she is addressing what, in theological terms, could be understood as 
structural or social sin.  
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Aquinas certainly sees shame in terms of disapproval or loss of face with others (ST 
2.2.144.3) and, in that sense, is located socially and culturally. This also suggests the 
influence of a collectivist, kin or shame-based culture. Aquinas’ treatment of shame 
together with honour reflects his Greek and Stoic sources in that they see disgrace 
(opprobrium) largely as a matter of social reputation. Shame is present in Aquinas as 
a form of social control even though it is not explored, as in Probyn, in sociological 
terms of habitus.  
 
However, in situating sensitivity to shame firmly within the virtue of temperance, 
Aquinas implies that it is primarily personal and relational. Further, as Gilby notes, its 
close relationship to a sense of sin (guilt) makes it more ‘personal and agonizing than 
the fear of earning a bad name’ (1968, 55). For Aquinas, humility is a corrective to the 
respectability of the ‘good and important citizen’ as it is to pride or any sanguine view 
of human nature and social life (ST 2.2.161-2; Gilby, Vol. 44, 1967, xv & xvi). 
Shame, for all its importance, reminds us of the reverberations of the primordial 
human sin and humanity’s dissonance and destructive tendencies (ST 2.2.163-5).  For 
Probyn as a writer, shame ‘enforces modesty’ (4). While she is conscious of shame’s 
damaging potential, especially in culturally embedded attitudes and practices that 
shape individuals and behaviour, its theological dimension is beyond the scope of her 
work. This brings us to our final guidepost. 
 
Shame as a universal capacity 
 
We have noted that Probyn taps different disciplines in her discussion of shame. 
Psychology helps to tell us ‘something about how our bodies dictate what we feel’ 
(Blush, xxx). Anthropology and sociology open doors on different ways of engaging 
social and cultural life. More specifically, Probyn draws on anthropological studies in 
Melanesia and correlates them with the psychological theory and studies of Tomkin. 
‘Blushing’ as the body calling ‘out its interest’ (28) has reverberations for the self in 
the social world, namely ‘[What] shame does to bodies and what bodies do to the 
organization of the social’ (27). The breadth and consistency of these studies together 
with Probyn’s self-reflection and the narratives of others indicate that all humans are 
born with the capacity for shame.  
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 Given the ubiquity of shame as a bodily, emotional and social reality, what is to be 
lost, asks Probyn, by engaging with those who approach shame using other methods 
and vocabulary (Blush, 25)? Studies across different disciplines indicate that there is 
‘something terribly important in shame – it is human to feel and to do it well’ (34). 
All humans blush. If the gagging reflex is an instinctual function to save the species 
from poisoning itself why not shame? Its innateness in our bodies and its organizing 
impact on social relations suggests that we are, by nature, social beings (34). Of 
course, she acknowledges, we cannot disregard cultural differences or the risk of 
promoting a Western model of affect. ‘Essentialist or ethnocentric epithets hover in 
the air’ as she says (28, italics in original). 
 
Probyn proposes that we need to be open to the evidence that shame may be 
‘biologically innate’ and see where that leads us. This does not imply that we all blush 
for the same reasons, namely that we experience shame in the same way or that some 
are not more vulnerable to shame, whether culturally or temperamentally. Why should 
there be any necessary opposition between what is particular and what is universal? 
‘Why should innate or universal characteristic always reduce difference?’ (29). ‘The 
notion of innate affects provides a way to understand both how certain phenomena are 
universal to humans and also how they differentiate in their causes and expressions at 
an individual level and within social groups’ (29). While Probyn recognizes that this 
form of essentialism may, in some circles, be considered heretical (xiii), she suggests 
that it should at least be taken seriously, if only to stretch us out of our ’intellectual 
comfort zone.’   
 
Aquinas would not consider such essentialism as outside his ‘comfort zone.’ It is 
consonant with his classical world view. Human nature, with its biological reality and 
its rationality, provide the two wings of human experience as revelatory, namely the 
gateway to discerning the law of human nature. Moral life is built on this foundation. 
For all that, the varieties of shame and its relationship to individual and 
temperamental differences remind us how human nature, as a source of morality, is 
subject to much variation. Aquinas acknowledges that, beyond the very general, it is 
difficult to arrive at moral norms that are certain and universal when faced with so 
much variability and contingency in human life.  
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 There is a strong case for seeing the desire for happiness as a justified underpinning of 
a moral theory. Emotions, such as shame, disclose who we are by pointing to what 
affects us. The more we are moved by the ‘fitting’ (right) objects, the more we come 
to human flourishing. This entails an order and harmony centred on love - in oneself 
(self-love), in ones relationship with God, towards others and the world in friendship 
and compassion. Aquinas uses the language of fittingness, of ‘being in or out of tune’ 
(consonans/dissonans) to describe the workings of human rationality since, in its 
wider setting, the human being is born to be ‘attuned to everything in so far as it is 
created in the image and likeness of God’13 The ethical naturalism underlying this is 
teleological and hence progressive. While, as Kerr further notes, things are ‘destined 
to a certain fulfillment, with appointed ends, modes and opportunities’,14 this involves 
the ongoing and free search for truth and value. ‘Right’ response and action are 
guided by who we ought to become (the divine image) and are paradigmatically 
embodied in the wise person.   
 
Aquinas’ classification of emotions is built on the assumption of a common humanity. 
Cultural variations and cross-cultural differences are not controlling considerations for 
Aquinas. For all that, if one compares Aquinas’ study of the emotions, it stands up 
well to contemporary studies and models. He is remarkably modern in his approach to 
negative emotions such as fear, anger and shame. Carlo Leget suggests that Aquinas’ 
formal taxonomy is ‘open to many cultural adaptations while reserving a primary 
place to the concept of love’.15  
      
The universal character of shame points to change and development as an historical 
consideration. Aquinas blends many influences from the twelfth century and 
specifically concerning the rise of the individual or of the self, traced by authors such 
as Colin Morris and Caroline Walker Bynum.16 There was a growing awareness, as 
Morris says, of a clear distinction between ‘my being and that of other people’.17 For 
Aquinas, it is not the modern self in terms of autonomy, namely of the self over and 
against the other. For him, God’s image is realized in the wisdom and virtue of a 
loving self that is responsive in the world of relationships.  
 
Further, Aquinas himself was shaped by his social environment as a Dominican friar. 
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Democratic processes were present at the beginnings of the Dominican culture and 
experience. Understandably, there are traces of this in his theological method and his 
anthropology. For instance, Aquinas holds that the human person flourishes as the 
image of God when intellect, will, emotions and body work collaboratively. 
 
Our considerations prompt a question on the relation between collective, kin-based 
cultures and those that are more individually orientated. Could it be argued that 
Aquinas straddles two worlds? We see in his writing on shame something of the 
shame-based culture with its strong sense of honour and of identity that is driven by 
community expectations and roles. But we can also detect hints of the emerging 
modern self with a sense of personal responsibility and self-direction.18 Could 
Aquinas be seen as a mirror of an incipient differentiation of consciousness, of a shift 
in cultural self-transcendence in the representation of truth and the appreciation of 
value? The controlling benchmark of Aquinas’s moral theory is not honour, shame or 
even autonomy. While they a have role, the moral life is ultimately guided and 
animated by love. It is especially embodied in mercy and responsiveness to the other. 
In fact, God’s power is most evident in divine mercy and compassion (See ST 2.2. 
30.4) and we are called to be grow in the image of that God. 
 
A contemporary parallel is in Gaita’s Romulus, my Father. 19 Romulus and his friend 
Hora believed that nothing mattered more than to live decently. They did not 
understand that their moral responses were informed by a different conception of 
morality. Its centre was goodness rather than the moral heroic virtues such as nobility,  
honour or autonomy.20 It was goodness whose scope was compassionate and 
merciful. In Romulus and Hora two worlds met. As Gaita says, it meant that his father 
was often conflicted by this which made him a troubled and interesting man. 
 
From what we have seen, one could argue that Aquinas adumbrates the transition 
from shame as a form of social control to one where it is reflects the sensitivity 
required in a healthy personal and social life. Aquinas seems to anticipate the 
democratic sensibility within which Probyn is situated. Friendship is his ruling 
paradigm – with God and others. He sees shame within relationships that are, at the 
least, as much equal and mutual as they are unequal and hierarchical. Yet precisely as 
relationships animated by love and the Spirit, they have an internal impulse to expand 
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in scope and depth. In others words, can we detect in Aquinas the beginnings of a 
shift from ‘saving face’ to ‘facing the other’?   
 
3. Final Observations 
Probyn and Aquinas would agree that ‘blushing is the body calling out its interest’. 
The body is a register of the whole person, not just spatially, psychologically, socially 
but also morally. There is a convergence between shame, values, and well-being both 
personal and social. It is summed up by Gerald Coleman: ‘Since our capacity to know 
what we are feeling and to experience those feelings is rooted in bodily experience, to 
be ambivalent about or alienated from our bodies is to be estranged from ourselves.’21 
Our discussion of shame highlights the extent to which Probyn and Aquinas, with 
their similarities and differences, complement each other. 
 
What emerges from this is the interplay between shame and culture? Probyn is able to 
overtake Aquinas in exploring how we can be out-of-place by stumbling into ‘other 
people’s history, culture and beliefs of which we are ignorant’ (Blush, xvi, 94-99). 
Again, while Aquinas is conscious of family shame for a criminal forbear (ST 1.2 81.1 
ad 6) as an analogy for original sin, Probyn points to the socially transforming aspect 
of shame/regret together with their relation to collective responsibility and 
reconciliation concerning indigenous peoples that is elaborated elsewhere by Gaita.22 
This topic is outside the scope of this article. Suffice it to ask, building on Girard, 
whether the form of shame associated with a concern for victims is ‘the secular face 
of Christian love’? 23 Shame is now a cultural response that suggests a movement in 
self-transcendence, a further differentiation of consciousness in which perception of 
truth is broadened and responsiveness to value is refined. Shame is now intertwined 
with what Anthony Kelly suggests is an unprecedented ‘stirring of conscience’ that is 
the transforming effect of one particular ‘risen’ victim, a sign that the ‘paschal 
mystery of Christ’s death and resurrection is in fact penetrating human history in a 
surprising way.’24 We seem to have uncovered another ‘face’ to shame. 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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